This op-ed by the distinguished historian Eric Foner reminds us that January 1st we celebrate the 200th anniversary of a law banning importation of slaves into the United States. President Jefferson signed the law on March 2, 1807, to take effect January 1, 1808. Trade in slaves within the United States continued until slavery was abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment.

In response to my post on the purposes behind the Fourteenth Amendment and the light they shed on the right to keep and bear arms, Deborah Pearlstein says she "need[s] some help understanding the evidentiary weight I should accord Senator Howard's remarks about the Fourteenth Amendment to our understanding of the meaning of Second." I'm happy to comply. Although what I have to say is formally in response to Deborah's questions, in fact Deborah is really giving me an excuse to say a little bit about the constitutional history of Reconstruction, America's second founding. I offer these remarks to all of my fellow progressive constitutional scholars.

Following up on Mark Graber's most recent post on the Supreme Court, consider why we might expect that the Supreme Court will not in fact produce principled results significantly superior to those produced by the national political process. One reason, famously suggested by Yale political scientist Robert Dahl, is that the U.S. Supreme Court tends, over time, to cooperate with the views of the dominant national political coalition. It does this by ratifying and legitimating most of the results of the national political process, by policing state and local governments so that they stay roughly in line with the views of national political elites, and (as Mark himself has pointed out) by acting as a political backstop to resolve controversies that national politicians would rather not have to take responsibility for.

The Supreme Court does tend to slow down rapid change when there is a shift in political regimes (and accompanying constitutional values), but eventually it goes along because new Justices appointed by the dominant national coalition replace older ones.

Most law professors and lawyers are convinced that the Supreme Court has a special capacity to be guided by constitutional values. Professor Ronald Dworkin of Oxford and New York University Law School described the Supreme Court as “an institution that calls some issues from the battleground of power politics to the forum of principle.” The Supreme Court “is predestined in the long run not only by the thrilling tradition of Anglo-American law but also by the hard facts of its position in the structure of American institutions,” Professor Henry Hart of Harvard Law School agreed, “to be a voice of reason, charged with the creative function of discerning afresh and of articulating and developing impersonal and durable principles of constitutional law.” Elected officials who make the slightest effort to limit federal judicial power bring down the wrath of a united bar. Lawyers of different political persuasions do not agree on much, but most wax eloquent about the virtues of an independent judiciary.

One would think from the recent excitement over the possibility of a bipartisan political movement that Hillary Clinton was running on a platform calling for confiscation of corporate property, reestablishment of the moderately progressive tax structure of the 1970s, the return of all American troops from abroad, the abolition of capital punishment, and (heaven forbid), gay marriage. With the exception of a stray remark by John Edwards, Democrats polling more than 10% continue to run to the right of Richard Nixon. Indeed, judging by their legislative activity this year, the Democrats as a whole have almost no ambition to push any program that is substantially to the left of center. The real issue ought to be why some journalists are so excited about the possibility of a third party that might take a middle position between the party clearly to right of the electorate and the party that on its best day sometimes lurches very slightly to the left.

Following the oral argument in Heller, people have been having a good old time making fun of the Justices and their pretty transparent political motivations. Dahlia Lithwick's amusing account of the oral argument is one of her best.

Although I enjoy making sport of the Justices as much as anyone, the question of whether the 2nd Amendment protects an individual right, including a right to self defense, is not that difficult, at least to me. The framers of the 14th amendment assumed that it was one of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. And if a right is a privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States, it hard for me to conclude that it does not bind the United States as well as the individual states.

Now, as a unreconstructed liberal (I'll show you pictures of my bleeding heart), I don't particularly like this result. But it follows sufficiently strongly from other commitments I have about the Constitution that I must accept it.

That's how I come out on the case, but of course, none of the Justices is likely to reason the way I do. So what do I think of their approaches and rationalizations, which were vividly on display at yesterday morning's oral argument?

Needless to say, many pundits are now commenting on the rules of the Democratic Party re the selection of its presidential candidate. See, e.g., E.J. Dionne's column in today's Washington Post, where he writes that "Democrats have contrived a nominating contest that even Rube Goldberg would have considered too convoluted, too dysfunctional and too improbable to name as his own." Save for the certainly peculiar way by which Texas names its delegates--I had the pleasure of voting twice for Barack Obama, once in early voting (in a secret ballot) and then several days later at my local caucus (which is definitely not secret)--I don't share the hostility to a preference-sensitive proportional representation system that does not negate the votes of everyone who doesn't vote for "the winner" (who may, as with McCain in a number of states, get distinctly less than a majority of the vote). But I've already made such arguments, and I won't rehearse them again. My current grumpiness is about something else, though regular readings of Balkinization shouldn't be surprised by what I'm about to write.

Professor David Adamany in an essay written many years ago maintained that one consequence of the FDR's Court-packing plan of 1937 was that Roosevelt lost vital political capital that could have been spent on other liberal reforms. Most scholars agree that after the failed Court-packing plan and the failed purge of southern conservatives in 1938, the momentum for the Second New Deal was largely over, not to be revived until the 1960s.

Professor Julie Novkov’s, Racial Union: Law, Intimacy, and the White State in Alabama 1865-1954 is a fascinating study of American racism that belongs with C. Vann Woodward’s The Strange Career of Jim Crow on the bookshelves of all persons interested in American political development, law and society, and the nature of race relationships in the United States. Woodward famously demonstrated that Jim Crow was not an inevitable consequence of the Civil War and the end of Reconstruction, that white supremacy in the post-Reconstruction South had many different manifestations. Novkov similarly, and as effectively, demonstrates that Jim Crow was not a monolithic system of racial subordination, that important political struggles took place in Alabama over the implementation and meaning of white supremacy even after separation of the races become a political axiom. Her analysis of appellate court appeals challenging the legality of miscegenation convictions provides a fascinating window into those struggles.

During the past decade, prominent political scientists have written terrific essays under the rubric "political regimes." Many essays cite as foundational such previous work as Robert Dahl’s "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policymaker," 6 Journal of Public Law 279 (1957). Neither Dahl nor the first studies which elaborated his thesis, however, used the term "political regimes" to describe their analysis. Indeed, these foundational works had a somewhat different point than works which self-consciously employ the "political regimes" label. At least, this is true of an essay I wrote that is sometimes cited in this vein. With some luck, this post (and possibly a few others) will clarify matters and not add to the confusion.

Grading constitutional law examinations provides an interesting window into what students are thinking and not thinking. As is the case with most professors, I find grading rather tedious, save for the occasional amusing mental typo. This year’s winner, on an examination that was quite good, was "the theory of the unitary executive gives the president the power to lead a rebellion against the United States." I hope no one tells Dick Cheney. Still, several points might be of broader interest and do not seem to be a violation of confidentiality.

Deborah Pearlstein asks what evidence we have that the right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right of the same kind as other fundamental rights, such as those mentioned in the Bill of Rights. I can offer no better evidence than the speech offered by Senator Jacob Howard, a member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction that drafted the Fourteenth Amendment and the floor manager of the Fourteenth Amendment. He was given the task of introducing the amendment before the United States Senate and explaining its purposes.

* * * * *

SENATOR JACOB HOWARD, SPEECH INTRODUCING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Speech delivered in the U.S. Senate, May 23, 1866 [CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866).]

Mr. HOWARD. . . . I can only promise to present to the Senate, in a very succinct way, the views and the motives which influenced th[e] committee, so far as I understand those views and motives, in presenting the report which is now before us for consideration, and the ends it aims to accomplish. . . . .

If there is one thing that is clear about contemporary America, it is that "democracy" scarcely describes our approach to politics. No, I'm not going to do another attack on our Constitution. Instead, I continue to be interested in the widespread belief that the Democratic primary has gone on "too long" and that something needs to be done to wrap it all up (and, in fact, that it should have been wrapped up weeks ago). As a committed Obamaite, I've not been above such thoughts, but as a slightly more detached analyst, I wonder what exactly is wrong about the current imbroglio, at least if one believes in democracy.

Consider the following: Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama actually have had to visit states like Texas, Wyoming, and Mississippi, which they will certainly not do for the general election. They will also find themselves in North Carolina and South Dakota before too very long. This means, among other things, that they are actually forced to become familiar with issues that might matter to people in those states and address them as, gasp, the equal of Democrats in safe states or the fabled swing voters in the few "battleground states." I'm opposed, of course,

Apparently everyone is up in arms over the fact that John McCain was born in the Panama Canal zone in 1936. Is he a "natural born citizen" eligible to be President under Article II, section 1, clause 4 of the Constitution?

I have to tell you, frankly, that whether McCain is "natural born" is the least of our worries. If you are truly an originalist, as I am, nobody is eligible to be president today.

I recently took Ed Whelan's simple one question test to determine whether you are really an originalist and confirmed that, yes, I am one of that proud and hardy band.

Q. The Constitution provides, as one of the criteria to be eligible to become president, that a person must be a "natural born Citizen" (or, alternatively, in a provision that long ago ceased to apply to any living persons, "a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution") How would you figure out what the phrase "natural born Citizen" means?

Paul Frymer's Black and Blue: African Amerians, the Labor Movement, and the Decline of the Democratic Party is an exceptional study of the relationships between the civil rights and labor movements during the second half of the twentieth century. Professor Frymer of the University of California, Santa Cruz, challenges both the common view in political science that courts cannot bring about social change, and the common view in law that courts are desirable agents for social change. The result is a far more nuanced understanding of the role of courts in American political and constitutional development. Judicial decisions matter, but they matter for reasons that confound scholars and policy activists. The book also tackles important problems in the politics of race.

I'm going to crosspost this at http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/slevinson/undemocratic/blog/, which is devoted entirely to discussion of the ideas in Our Undemocratic Constitution (and which, since the Moyers interview, is getting some participation). I invite anyone on this list to join the discussion there.

The heart of Mark's post is as follows:

Mike Huckabee is the latest Republican candidate to call for amending the Constitution, though Mitt Romney has led the way. It was "flip-flop" Mitt who in recently told the Family Values Research Council's Values Voter Summit, "I will work with the people in this room, as I have for the past four years, to champion a federal marriage amendment to protect marriage as the union of a man and a woman. ... Make no mistake: a federal amendment is the only way we can protect marriage from liberal, unelected judges" [who may, of course, be interpreting the Equal Protection Clause accurately, a possibility that Romney presumably doesn't recognize].

This Wall Street Journal op-ed by Steven Calabresi and John McGinnis argues for John McCain on the grounds that he will appoint the judges who will "restor[e] constitutional government" and prevent Democrats from "threaten[ing] the jurisprudential gains of the past three decades, and provid[ing] new impetus to judicial activism of a kind not seen since the 1960s":
The expected value of any presidential candidate for the future of the American judiciary must be discounted by the probability that the candidate will not prevail in the election. For other kinds of issues, it may be argued that it is better to lose with the perfect candidate than to win with an imperfect one. The party lives to fight another day and can reverse the bad policies of an intervening presidency.

The judiciary is different. On Jan. 20, 2009, six of the nine Supreme Court justices will be over 70. Most of them could be replaced by the next president, particularly if he or she is re-elected. Given the prospect of accelerating gains in modern medical technology, some of the new justices may serve for half a century. Even if a more perfect candidate were somehow elected in 2012, he would not be able to undo the damage, especially to the Supreme Court.

Pam Karlan

As I said in my initial post about Rick Hills's comments on the Voting Rights Act and civil rights lawyers, I don't want to get into a long exchange about the relationship between local government and section 5. In particular, blogging often leads people to shoot too much from the hip on complicated topics (Balkinization is a rare and welcome exception and I don't want to reduce the average quality of the posts.) Rick posted a response on Prawsfblawg that, among other things, recognizes that the tone of his earlier post was a bit much. But now that his more ad hominem accusations have been cleared away, I think it's worth this one additional comment from me about the nature of the substantive disagreement Rick and I have. Then I'll stop.

If I understand Rick’s general point correctly, he criticizes the Voting Rights Act for being unable to recognize the benefits that might (note, might) accrue to minority citizens if states were required to devolve more power away from state-level government and to local governments. So, for example, he writes that

I just finished my introduction to the University of Maryland Law Review Symposium: "An Eighteenth Century Constitution in a Twenty-First Century World." The essays are terrific. I hope many of you read them when published. The first paragraph of my introduction declares:

I don't want to distract our readers from the very important story about the Administration's stonewalling of the 9/11 Commission -- read about the New York Times's essential story and the Zelikow Report here -- but this is very much worth your attention, too:

Continuing his invaluable work, Charlie Savage of the Boston Globe today publishes responses of nine presidential candidates to a series of questions he posed about the topics that have dominated this blog since 2004. I'll add some highlights here shortly -- in the meantime, go read the responses.

Many supporters of Second Amendment rights are, pardon the pun, up in arms over the Bush Administration Justice Department's amicus brief in Heller, the Second Amendment case now before the Supreme Court. The government's brief recognizes an individual right to bear arms but argues that historically the right excluded felons (even though they are presumably part of "the People"). Moreover, it argues that the Second Amendment may permit a wide range of reasonable regulations of firearms.

The New York Times reports that "28 retired generals and admirals plan to release a letter on Friday urging Congress to repeal" the law requring the military's don't ask don't tell policy. This is an unjust policy that is on its way to repeal. The only question is when.

In a previous post I predicted that the Supreme Court would find for individual rights advocates in the upcoming Heller case, but that this might advantage gun control advocates and the Democratic party in the short run. Responding to my analysis, James Skoufis over at Real Clear Politics argues:

Unless Barack Obama wins both Texas and Ohio (and adds Pennsylvania a couple of weeks later for good measure), the race will go on, and the controversy about counting delegates from Florida and Michigan will become ever more heated. The Clinton position that the results of the primaries held there in January, in patent defiance of the Democratic National Committee, should be honored, is preposterous. The candidates had pledged to honor the ban by not campaigning there. Obama wasn't even on the ballot in one of those states and certainly didn't campaign. But if Clinton and Obama remain more-or-less tied after the next string of primaries, there will, I suspect, be great pressure to rehold the primaries in a context where both candidates can campaign. This appears fair on the surface, but there is a real paradox in adopting this solution.

This op-ed appeared on History News Network and in the Los Angeles Daily Journal, and is cross-posted on the Legal History Blog:

The recent anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education falls nearly 100 years since the 20th century's greatest civil rights lawyer, Thurgood Marshall, was born (July 2, 1908). Brown was a milestone in the nation's civil rights history; the case also christened Marshall, the plaintiff's lead attorney, as "Mr. Civil Rights." Not long after, Marshall would be eclipsed by a new generation of civil rights leaders. His greatest disappointment, however, was to see the court that decided Brown turn away from his legacy.

Mark Kende, Professor of Law at Drake and current chair of the Section on Constitutional Law has an inspired idea for the program at the next AALS meeting. The program notice is below. Scholars perhaps overuse the concept of a "crisis" (although it is eye-catching), but there is little doubt there are some strange doctrinal developments in U.S. conlaw. Mostly because of Justice Kennedy, I find I have a harder time explaining to students what the "standard" approach to equal protection and substantive due process jurisprudence is supposed to be. But perhaps it is fairer to say the entire Court seems less interested in the sort of hyper-articulated "tiers of scrutiny" which I absorbed in law school as among the most important doctrinal developments of the 1970s. That entire era in conlaw now seems played out. Again, "doctrinal chaos" seems a bit strong, there are always important inconsistencies in conlaw jurisprudence. But more attention should have been paid to Laurence Tribe's announcement, in the wake of the Schiavo mess in 2005, that he could not produce a new edition of his famous conlaw treatise.

2009 ANNUAL AALS MEETING: AALS SECTION ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CALL FOR PAPERS: IS AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CRISIS?

Probably the most famous dissent in the history of the United States Supreme Court is Holmes’ dissent in Lochner (1905). “The 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics,” he declaimed.

“A constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizens to the state or of laissez faire.”

Holmes’ attack on the majority has been quoted innumerable times, and is widely considered a brilliant statement of what was wrong with the majority view.

There is reason to believe that Holmes’ got his argument—or at least the idea—from an article that was published a dozen years earlier (which I accidentally stumbled across). In 1893, making an argument that is remarkably resonant of Holmes’ dissent, C.B. Labatt described what he saw as a newly emerging theory of constitutional interpretation: