Tragic Choices and Constitutional Reform
Professor David Adamany in an essay written many years ago maintained that one consequence of the FDR's Court-packing plan of 1937 was that Roosevelt lost vital political capital that could have been spent on other liberal reforms. Most scholars agree that after the failed Court-packing plan and the failed purge of southern conservatives in 1938, the momentum for the Second New Deal was largely over, not to be revived until the 1960s.
Roosevelt’s experience may teach two related lessons about politics. The first is that politics cannot be about everything at once. Political movements must choose their issues. Abraham Lincoln urged his former Whig followers not to raise tariff issues in order to maintain a united front against the expansion of slavery. Ronald Reagan during his first term downplayed opposition to abortion in order to maintain a united front in favor budget cuts. Roosevelt, by choosing to emphasize judicial reform, diverted vital resources from previous fights for economic equality. The second is that politics makes strange bedfellows. To paraphrase Churchill on his alliance with Stalin, he would make a pact with the Devil to fight Hitler (I’ve forgotten the exact quote). Roosevelt’s coalition of racist southern populists and northern workers (who, as Paul Frymer points out, were not exactly racial egalitarians) accomplished much good. Roosevelt’s effort to forge a purer coalition stalled his program completely.
For the past year, my friend and co-blogger Sandy Levinson has called for a political movement for constitutional reform. He is correct to note that many features of the contemporary constitution are undemocratic and that others suffer from different flaws. The call for a political movement, however, entails more than the observation that the constitution is defective. Rather, participants in the political movement must believe the defects of the constitution are significantly worse than the other ills of American politics so that, in the political conflicts between political conflicts, constitutional revision ought to take precedence over questions of war and peace, economic reform, environmental degradation, etc. At the very least, political resources allocated to those political struggles ought to be diverted. This, of course, raises two questions. On what issues should diversion take place? Who should be diverted? Perhaps a political movement for constitutional reform can be done without diversion, but the Roosevelt experience in 1937 suggests that liberals who engage in constitutional reform pay liberal costs for diverting the electorate. At the very least, those who attend Sandy's call for suggestions to how to form this political movement ought to take seriously the costs to other desired political movements and either explain why the benefits will outweigh the costs or why, in fact, this movement for constitutional reform will, unlike any other, have no substantial costs for liberal goals.